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LABOR LAW
REINSTATEMENT AND BACK PAY UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
The Lumber and Sawmill Workers' Union, having been designated
as the bargaining agent by the National Labor Relations Board, and
being unable to reach an agreement with the Carlisle Lumber Co.,
called a strike. The company then formally discharged all workers and
shut down. A few months later, preparing to resume operations, they
required all applicants to be non-union men. The N.L.R.B. found the
company guilty of unfair labor practices and ordered the reinstatement
of the striking employees, except those who had received regular and
substantially equivalent employment elsewhere; it also awarded back
pay, less any amounts earned, to all strikers from the time of the unfair
labor practice. The court, through Judge Haney, upheld the Board's
order as being constitutional; refused to require the Board to take further
evidence; and refused to deny the Board's order because of violence
by the Union. N.L.R.B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F (2d) 138
(C.C.A. 9 th, 1938).
In Mooresville Cotton Mills v. N.L.R.B., 94 F (2d) 6x (C.C.A.
4 th, 1938), the United Textile Workers of America called a strike.
The mills continued operating and hiring men. The N.L.R.B. found
that the company had discriminated against eight men by refusing to
reinstate them, and ordered reinstatement of all eight with back pay.
Judge Soper, speaking for the court, affirmed the order as to four men
and found that the remaining four had received substantially equivalent
employment elsewhere and were not entitled to reinstatement, but were
entitled to back pay for the period between refusal of reinstatment and
obtainment of other employment.
Another case just decided by the N.L.R.B. is also worthy of note.
The Board found that the employer being guilty of violence, did not
come before the Board with clean hands in asking it to refuse reinstate-
ment to employees also guilty of violence, but otherwise entitled to it.
Evidence of violence by the strikers was held to be relevant in deter-
bining whether it is equitable for the Board to order reinsatement, but
the Board took into consideration evidence only of convictions and pleas
of guilty by individual strikers. Strikers convicted of felonies were de-
nied reinstatement, but others, convicted of misdemeanors, were ordered
reinstated, the employer being found to have been responsible for more
serious acts of violence than those to which the strikers pleaded guilty.
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In Re Republic Steel Corp. and Steel Workers' Organizing Committee,
2 L.R.R. 224 (Apr. 18, 1938).
Of the several points raised by these three opinions this note will
confine itself to: (i) Reinstatement with back pay of discharged em-
ployees; (2) Reinstatement and right to back pay for striking employ-
ees; (3) Substantially equivalent employment elsewhere as a bar to
reinstatement; (4) Violence by strikers as a bar to relief; (5) Admis-
sion of new evidence.
In regard to the first point the National Labor Relations Board has
repeatedly ordered reinstatement with back pay of men discriminately
discharged. In Re Ford Motor Co. and Int'l Union, United duto
Workers of America, i L.R.R. 449 (Dec. 1937); In Re Montgomery
Ward & Co. Inc. and United Mail Order and Retail Workers of
America, i L.R.R. 627 (Jan. 1938); In Re Cardinale Trucking
Corp. and Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, i L.R.R. 688 (Feb. 1938); and
others. In fact this power is expressly conferred in the Act. 29 U.S.C.
I6o(c). The courts have upheld this power and its constitutionality.
Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. N.L.R.B., 9 3 F(2d) 985 (C.C.A.
4 th, 1938); N.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand Inc., 9 4 F(2d) 862
(C.C.A. 2d, 1938); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301
U.S. I, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, lo8 A.L.R. 1352 (1937);
N.L.R.B. v Pacific Greyhound Lines Inc., 9 1F(2d) 458 (C.C.A. 9 th,
1937); Agwilines Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 87F(2d) 146 (C.C.A. 5th,
1936). In ordering the payment of back wages the Board has often
determined the amount of back pay. In Re Wald Transfer & Storage
Co. Inc. and Intl Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen
and Helpers of America, i L.R.R. 2o6 (Sept. 1937); In Re Cardinale
Trucking Corp., supra; In Re Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc., supra.
This power also was sustained in N.L.R.B. v. Pacific Greyhound Lines
Inc., supra, as well as in N.L.R.B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., supra.
The same treatment has been accorded striking employees as dis-
charged ones. In Re Lenox Shoe Co., Inc. and United Shoe Workers
of America, i L.R.R. 401 (Dec., 1937); In Re Wald Transfer and
Storage Co., supra; In Re American Mfg. Co. and Textile Workers'
Organizing Committee C.I.O., i L.R.R. 720 (Feb., 1938). But
there has been controversy on this point among the courts. Under the
Act an employee who strikes is still considered an employee. 29
U.S.C.A. Sec. 152(3). The court in the Carlisle case, supra, citing
Jeffrey-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. N.L.R.B., 9 1F(2d) 134 (C.C.A.
1937), stated that the relationship of employer and employee is not com-
pletely terminated by a strike, but that a new status arises-that of a
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"striking employee." The court stated that it had not held to the con-
rary in N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 87 F (2d) 6I, Re-
hearing 9 2F (2d) 761 (C.C.A. 9 th, 1937). In that case Judge Wilbur
had held that reinstatement can be required only when an employee
ceased work because of an unfair labor practice, and when work ceased
before that time, to require reinstatement is to force the employer to
make a new contract, violative of the 5th Amendment. Judge Garrecht,
dissenting, pointed out that the Act clearly states that the employment
relation does not cease when there is a strike, and that the Act applies
when the men cease work in consequence of a labor dispute even before
an unfair labor practice. The court in the Carlisle case, supra, evidently
felt that the situation was different, as the strike there occurred at the
time of the unfair labor practice. It is significant to note that on Feb.
28, 1938, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari
in the Mackay case.*" Other courts have sustained the constitutionality of
this section of the Act as to due process. N.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand
Inc., supra, where the Carlisle case was cited as overruling the Mackay
case; N.L.R.B. v. Pacific Greyhound Lines Inc., supra; Black Diamond
Steamship Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 9 4 F(2d) 875 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938);
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra.
On the issue of back pay the Board has not distinguished men who
have struck from men who were discharged, and has awarded back pay
from the date of refusal to reinstate until the actual reinstatement. In
Re Boss Mfg. Co. and Int'l Glove Workers of America, i L.R.R. 8o
(Aug., 1937); In Re Wald Transfer & Storage Co., supra; In Re
4merican Mfg. Co., supra. The courts in general uphold the exercise
of this power. N.L.R.B. v. Black Diamond Steamship Corp., supra,
and N.L.R.B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., supra, accepting this case as
overruling N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., supra.
The fact that an employee has at the time of the Board's decision,
substantially equivalent employment elsewhere, has been regarded by
the Board as a bar to reinstatement. In Re Hopwood Retinning Co.
Inc. and Metal Polishers, Buffers, Platers and Helpers Int'l Union,
i L.R.R. 56i (Jan. 15, 1938). The Board in one case held that
employees who had obtained substantially equivalent employment else-
where, had their choice as to reinstatement. In Re Highway Trailer
Co. and U.A.W. of America, I L.R.R. 232 (Sept., 1937). The
courts generally have upheld the former type of decision. N.L.R.B. v.
Carlisle-Lumber Co., supra; N.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand Inc., supra.
But in the Mooresville case, supra, the court held that the time to deter-
mine the right to reinstatement is at the date of the court decision. The
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court in that case rejected the Board's contention that Sec. lO(c), [29
U.S.C. I6o(c)], is broad enough to give the Board power to require
reinstatement whether other employment has been obtained or not.
The court said that Sec. io(c) did not give such broad powers, but that
Congress only wished to indicate that the employer-employee relation-
ship is not terminated by a strike.
The Board's position on this point would seem the better. The
broad policy behind the Act is to protect self-organization of employees.
The right to reinstatement is a necessary incident to this policy. The
ruling of the M1'ooresville case will be a powerful deterrent to a striker's
search for new employment. The striker will be reluctant to take
another job, if he stands to lose his former one and perhaps his seniority
rights. If the employees employed elsewhere are key figures in the labor
organization, this opinion will damage organizational activities as well,
tending to discourage membership in labor organizations. This too
would contradict this policy. Further the position taken by the court
raises the question of the indicia to be employed in determining whether
an employee has substantially equivalent employment elsewhere. The
Board's position avoids this question, by leaving the choice to the per-
sonal preference of the employees. Their preference is better evidence
than any court decision, of the inequality of the jobs.
Approximately three months after the Mooresville case the Board
held that a higher wage is no bar to reinstatement as being substantially
equivalent employment. In Re The Kelly Springfield Tire Co. and
United Rubber Workers of Ymerica, 2 L.R.R. i95 (Mar., 1938).
In the few cases where violence has occurred, the Board has held
it no bar to reinstatement. In Re Biles-Coleman Lumber Co. and
Puget Sound Dist. Council of Lumber and Sawmill Workers, i L.R.R.
484 (Dec., 1937); In Re Standard Lime and Stone Co. and Quarry
Workers Int'l Union of N.A., i L.R.R. 654 (Feb., 1938); In Re
Inland Steel Corp. and S.W.O.C. & Areal. Iss'n. of Iron, Steel and
Tin Workers of N.A., 2 L.R.R. i8o (Apr. 5, 1938); In Re Republic
Steel Corporation, supra. But in the Republic Steel case, supra, the
Board refused reinstatement to men convicted of felonies, possibly be-
cause the men were unavailable. The former cases have been upheld in
N.L.R.B. v. Remington Rand Inc., supra, no reasons being given. In
N.L.R.B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., supra, the court stated that the Board
was the petitioner, and not the Union, and therefore violence by union
men was no bar to the Board's order.
The question of admitting new evidence was raised in N.L.R.B. v.
Carlisle Lumber Co., supra. There a company union had made a con-
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tract with the company covering wages, hours, etc., and asked the court
to order the Board to take further evidence under 29 U.S.C. I6o(e).
The court held that in the absence of a showing that the evidence was
as required by the statute, "material and that there were reasonable
grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing," the
request should be denied. dccord, N.L.R.B. v. Oregon Worsted Co.,
2 L.R.R. 231, - Fed. 2d -, (C.C.A. 9 th, Apr. II, 1938). In the
same case there was a question as to the amount of back wages, and the
court had to decide whether they should direct the Board to take new
evidence or whether they should wait until one of the parties applied to
the court. The court decided in favor of the latter, and suggested that
the employees follow the course provided in the act. In a previous case
the court ordered the parties to agree as to the amount within ten days.
N.L.R.B. v. Pacific Greyhound Line, supra. The court in the instant
case felt the situation was different as the employees were many and the
wage problem full of difficulties.
From the foregoing it will be seen that all courts are agreed as to
the constitutionality of the section of the Act empowering the Board to
require reinstatement of discharged employees with back pay. As to
reinstatement of striking employees with back pay, the point is still one
in controversy. Those courts holding reinstatement legal also uphold
back pay. The requirement that employees do not have substantially
equivalent employment elsewhere in order to be entitled to reinstatement
is recent and still unsettled. The presence of violence by employees has
never been held to be a bar to reinstatement and for back pay. Although
the power to require the Board to take additional evidence on application
of one of the parties is, by statute, within the discretion of the courts,
they have not as a matter of practice so required. The Carlisle case,
supra, is the first instance of a suggestion on the part of a court that a
party apply for such an order.
LEON N. STONE
* Since the writing of this note, the United States Supreme Court has reversed the
decision of the circuit court of appeals and held strikers remained employees under section
2 (3) of the Act N.L.R.B. v. Mackey Radio and Tel. Co., 5 U.S.L.W. 1126 (May x6,
1938).
